Industrial scale theft of video services, especially live sport, is in the ascendance. Combating piracy is a formidable challenge, providing a direct threat to profitability for broadcasters and streamers.

Big tech is both friend and foe in solving the piracy problem. Conflicting incentives harm consumer safety by providing easy discovery of illegal pirated services, and reduced friction through low-cost hardware such as the Amazon Firestick.

Over twenty years since launch, the DRM solutions provided by Google and Microsoft are in steep decline. A complete overhaul of the technology architecture, licensing, and support model is needed. Lack of engagement with content owners indicates this a low priority.

Germany suffered a sizeable EBITDA decline in the 2H of FY25, and guidance for European EBITDA next year implies another tough year in FY26 with an underlying 5% decline for Europe as a whole excluding 1&1.

Elsewhere, the UK had a very solid FY25 and is a good news story for the Group with the merger with Three in prospect, but the Rest of World’s contribution is likely to diminish from here.

Various one-offs will support the outlook for next year, but operational execution is at the core of Vodafone’s raison d’être. Beyond some encouraging KPIs, investors continue to await meaningful evidence of such.

The slowdown in telecoms traffic volume growth post-pandemic has persisted for far longer than a simple hangover effect would imply, and has spread from fixed broadband to mobile in many markets

The eventual emergence of the metaverse and/or AI-generated traffic may mitigate this trend, but it is hard to see growth ever returning to a sustained 30%+ per annum level, with around 10-15% likely to prove the new normal

While far from disastrous for telcos, it does have important implications, such as the need to structure pricing more carefully, focus on network quality over capacity, and be more wary of the threat (or opportunity) from MVNOs, FWA and satellite

VMO2 reported solid financials in Q1, with revenue and EBITDA growth both improving and both (just) ahead of full year guidance.

Subscriber momentum however was poor across fixed and mobile, despite customer service improving, with broadband in particular likely to get worse as network buildout slows.

Meeting full year guidance is still achievable, but will likely require a significant altnet slowdown sooner rather than later in the year.

UEFA and Relevent, a newly appointed media rights sales partner, are already surveying the rights market for the next cycle starting in 2027.

With minimal competitive tension in major European markets, incumbent broadcasters are unlikely to increase their bids.

Relevent will, however, try to leverage increased US appetite for soccer to lure a streamer into a global deal.

2024 was the first year in history in which the network operators lost contract subscribers. MVNOs added 1.7m.

In-contract price increases are dominating revenue trends, with a somewhat flatlining outlook on an underlying basis but boosted by accounting technicalities.

We expect the Vodafone3 merger to close on 1 of May which has implications for buyout timing and will prompt higher capex, some early network upsides, and big strategic decisions for both Vodafone3 and BT/EE.

Most regulations within the TAR26 condoc were continuations of the previous pro-investment regulations, albeit with little progress made on copper withdrawal, no extra help for the struggling altnets and a number of unexpected twists at the margin. 

Within the detail, the most significant hit is the return of cost-based price controls to some leased line charges, and across all of the proposed changes, Openreach has on balance fared worse than retail ISPs, albeit at a scale that is manageable within the BT Group.

Ofcom showed no inclination to offer any extra help to the struggling altnet industry, regarding its inefficiencies as being its own (and its investors’) problem, with consolidation the only sensible path forward for most.

The ‘big 4’ ISPs’ combined revenue remained in decline in Q4 2024 at -0.4%, partly due to a BT accounting quirk but mainly due to altnets gaining share

ARPU growth of 2% is roughly compensating for subscriber declines of 2%, but this ARPU growth is likely to weaken in 2025 as various boosts drop out

A recovery will come as the altnets slow in H2 2025 (if not before) due to their restrained expansion, which cannot come soon enough for the big ISPs

With the formation of Vodafone3, we envisage continued intense competition at the low end of the mobile market, a ramping up of pressure at the top end over time, and some opportunities in the short term.

New information on spectrum trading confirms the view that BT/EE will be most capacity constrained, but with various strategic options available to it.

Expected EBITDA growth of 9% p.a. at Vodafone3 would allow Vodafone Group to almost double its excess FCF. Budgeting for buying CK Hutchison’s stake, however, may curtail Vodafone’s spending over the coming years.

VMO2 had another mixed quarter to end a difficult 2024, with revenue growth improving but EBITDA growth falling, and other metrics mixed at best.

The company hopes to put this behind it with guidance for both revenue and EBITDA growth in 2025, a tough ask given current momentum.

Ultimately achieving or exceeding this may depend on altnet pressure receding, which we expect it to do, but perhaps more towards the end of the year than the beginning.